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INTRODUCTION 
Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the State of Washington 
guarantees, “Justice in all cases shall be administered openly, and with-
out unnecessary delay.”1 The Washington State Supreme Court has  
interpreted this clause to guarantee the public a right to attend legal pro-
ceedings and to access court documents separate and apart from the 
rights of the litigants themselves.2 Based on this interpretation, the court 
has struck down laws protecting the identity of both juvenile victims of 
sexual assault and individuals subject to involuntary commitment hear-
ings. Its interpretation has also compromised the privacy rights of liti-
gants wrongly named in legal proceedings.3 The court has supported 
these rulings by claiming that the public’s right of access to the courts “is 
rooted in centuries-old English common law.”4 
A dispassionate examination of the history of English common law 
does not support the court’s interpretation of history. While there was a 
tradition of publicly held legal proceedings at English common law, 
there was no right of the public to attend such proceedings. A criminal 
defendant’s right to a public proceeding was first articulated in the 
American colonies.5 It was not until 1975 that Washington courts found 
members of the public to have a right independent of the litigants them-
selves. Given this historical context, the Washington State Supreme 
Court should reign in its extreme open courts jurisprudence by adopting 
a more narrowly tailored balancing test to determine when the public 
should have a right to access legal proceedings or court documents. Such 
an interpretation would give more weight to the privacy rights of indi-
viduals impacted by litigation. 
Part I of this Article engages in a detailed exploration of the history 
of the right of public access to legal proceedings and court records, going 
back to Magna Carta of 1215 and other historical accounts of English 
common law. It also explores the tradition of publicly held proceedings, 
as well as the articulation of defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights under 
the United States Constitution and other early colonial documents. The 
Article then considers the history of Article I, Section 10 of Washing-
ton’s constitution, the “Open Courts Clause,”6 and the early interpreta-
tions of the state constitution. From there, it examines the more recent 
                                                     
 1. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 2. See infra Part I.D. 
 3. See infra text accompanying note 121. 
 4. Cohen v. Everett City Council, 535 P.2d 801, 803 (Wash. 1975) (citing In re Oliver, 333 
U.S. 257, 266 (1948)). 
 5. See infra Part I.B. 
 6. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
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precedent, where the independent right of the public is articulated. Part II 
of this Article urges Washington courts to reexamine the Experience and 
Logic Test, which has been adopted by the Washington State Supreme 
Court to guide the lower courts’ application of the “Open Courts 
Clause.” Finally, Part III of this Article contends that certain cases may 
need to be reexamined in light of the court’s adoption of the Experience 
and Logic Test. 
I. A HISTORY OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO LEGAL PROCEEDINGS 
The Washington State Supreme Court has waxed poetic about what 
it believes to be a storied history of public access to legal proceedings: 
Open access to the courts is grounded in our common law herit-
age and our national and state constitutions. For centuries publicity 
has been a check on the misuse of both political and judicial power. 
As a leading theorist of the Enlightenment wrote: 
Let the verdicts and proofs of guilt be made public, so that 
opinion, which is, perhaps, the sole cement of society, may 
serve to restrain power and passions; so that the people may 
say, we are not slaves, and we are protected—a sentiment 
which inspires courage and which is the equivalent of a 
tribute to a sovereign who knows his own true interests. 
CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 22 (Henry Pao-
lucci trans., Bobbs–Merrill Co., Inc.1963) (1764). 
Proceedings cloaked in secrecy foster mistrust and, potentially, 
misuse of power.7 
Washington State Supreme Court opinions have referenced the right of 
the public to view legal proceedings to be “at the core of our system of 
justice,” a “bedrock foundation,”8 and a “vital constitutional safeguard.”9 
However, history does not support these sweeping claims. It was not 
until 1975, in Cohen v. Everett City Council, that the Washington State 
Supreme Court interpreted Article I, Section 10 of the Washington con-
stitution as granting the public a right to access legal proceedings that 
was separate from the right of the litigants.10 Prior to 1975, the jurispru-
dence on the right to publicly held legal proceedings had been limited to 
the context of criminal trials, and even that right dates back to the Amer-
ican colonies, not English common law. 
                                                     
 7. Dreiling v. Jain, 93 P.3d 861, 866 (Wash. 2004). 
 8. State v. S.J.C., 352 P.3d 749, 763 (Wash. 2015). 
 9. Hundtofte v. Encarnación, 330 P.3d 168, 172 (Wash. 2014). 
 10. Cohen v. Everett City Council, 535 P.2d 801, 803 (Wash. 1975). 
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A. Public Proceedings at English Common Law 
At the time of the Norman Conquest, the English legal system in-
cluded a hodgepodge of different courts. There were “communal courts,” 
such as the County Court, the Hundred Court, and the Curia Regis (also 
known as the King’s Court).11 There were also private or franchise 
courts.12 The private courts were relics of a feudal system in which large 
landowners exercised a broad reign over an entire region.13 The descrip-
tions of the County Court and the Hundred Court include specific,  
predetermined days on which court would be held.14 They also included 
a system of mandatory court attendance for local land owners, although 
such duties were often assigned to the tenants or other subjects.15 These 
descriptions lead to a presumption that most legal proceedings of the 
communal courts were conducted in public. However, there is no histori-
cal record indicating that litigants had a right to publicly held legal pro-
ceedings or that members of the public had a right to attend such pro-
ceedings. Moreover, the presumption of openness would not have ap-
plied to the private or franchise courts. 
Many legal scholars look to Magna Carta,16 also known as The 
Great Charter of 1215, and its subsequent iterations, as one of the earliest 
records of English common law rights. Magna Carta was a charter first 
drafted by the Archbishop of Canterbury to make peace between the un-
popular King John and a group of rebel barons.17 In the charter, King 
John made promises regarding protection of church rights, protection of 
the barons from illegal imprisonment, access to swift justice, and limita-
tion on payments by the barons to the crown.18 
Magna Carta is generally divided into 63 clauses.19 Clauses 17 
through 20 detail how and where lawsuits should be litigated and require 
that courts meet on predetermined days in each county four times per 
year.20 Much like the County and Hundred Courts, courts that met in 
compliance with Magna Carta were scheduled at a predetermined time 
                                                     
 11. 1 SIR WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 17–24 (Methuen, 7th 
ed. 1966) (1903). 
 12. Id. at 3–24. 
 13. Id. at 17–24. 
 14. Id. at 11. 
 15. Id. at 11–12. 
 16. The words “Magna Carta” are generally translated as “The Great Charter” including the 
article “the,” so the authors refer to Magna Carta in this Article without using an additional article. 
 17. Claire Breay & Julian Harrison, Magna Carta: An Introduction, BRIT. LIBR., 
http://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-an-introduction (last visited May 23, 2016). 
 18. English Translation of Magna Carta, BRIT. LIBR., http://www.bl.uk/magna-
carta/articles/magna-carta-english-translation (last visited May 23, 2016). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
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and place, thus it would have been possible for members of the public to 
observe the proceedings. 
While Magna Carta appears to assume that many legal proceedings 
would be conducted in public, as was the practice of the time, the charter 
does not explicitly guarantee a right to the public or to individual liti-
gants to have proceedings occur in public. However, many other rights 
are described in Magna Carta explicitly and in great detail, including 
how many days a widow may remain in her deceased husband’s house,21 
when and how interest may accrue on a debt,22 when a person can be 
forced to build bridges,23 and so on. 
Clause 40 of Magna Carta reads as follows: “Nulli vendemus, nulli 
negabimus, aut differemus rectum aut justiciam,” which has been trans-
lated as “To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or jus-
tice.”24 This clause is referenced as a source for many subsequent consti-
tutional provisions that articulate a right to “open courts.”25 However, 
here, the term “open courts” applies not to a right of the public to attend 
legal proceedings, nor to a right of litigants to have their case conducted 
in public; rather, it applies to the right of litigants to have their case heard 
and resolved by the court, without having to pay for the privilege. Specif-
ically, the words “to no one deny . . . justice” are the words that scholars 
point to for this proposition.26 In other words, the courts will be open to 
all litigants for the resolution of their disputes. 
This is an important distinction and one that some scholars have 
conflated.27 It is correct to say that the concept of open courts dates to 
Magna Carta if one is referring to a prohibition on the sale of writs and 
the courts being open to litigants to resolve their disputes. However, it is 
not accurate to say open courts, as in a right to a publicly held legal pro-
ceeding, dates back to Magna Carta. 
In the mid-1500s, Sir Thomas Smith, an English diplomat who 
served in France, wrote a treatise on the system of English government 
                                                     
 21. Id. cl. 7. 
 22. Id. cl. 10. 
 23. Id. cl. 23. 
 24. Id. cl. 40. Magna Carta was written by King John and addressed to the barons; “we” refers 
to King John or the crown. 
 25.  See Jeanine Blackett Lutzenhiser, An Open Courts Checklist: Clarifying Washington’s 
Public Trial and Public Access Jurisprudence, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1203, 1206 n.17 (2012); see also 
Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law: The Origins of the Open Courts Clause of State 
Constitutions, 74 OR. L. REV. 1279, 1281 (1995); David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. 
L. REV. 1197, 1199–200 (1992). 
 26. RAYMOND B. STRINGHAM, MAGNA CARTA: FOUNTAINHEAD OF FREEDOM 54–56 (1966). 
 27. See sources cited supra note 25.  
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titled De Republica Anglorum.28 According to Sir Thomas Smith, part of 
the reason that the English legal system required members of the public 
to be present was because of the relatively sparse written documentation 
of legal proceedings: 
[A]lthough it will seeme straunge to all nations that doe use the civ-
ill Lawe of the Romane Emperours, that for life and death there is 
nothing put in writing but the enditement onely. All the rest is 
doone openlie in the presence of the Judges, the Justices, the 
enquest, the prisoner, and so manie as will or can come so neare as 
to heare it, and all depositions and witnesses given aloude, that all 
men may heare from the mouth of the depositors and witnesses 
what is saide.29 
According to Sir Thomas Smith’s description, the public nature of trials 
in England can be understood as an artifact of the need to create a record, 
rather than a right of the accused or a right of the public to view the pro-
ceedings. 
Another potential source of the right to publicly held legal proceed-
ings was the backlash to the Star Chamber.30 The Star Chamber was a 
court with a wide-ranging jurisdiction derived from an ancient concept of 
“King in Council.”31 The court rose in prominence after the passage of 
the Star Chamber Act in 1487,32 and it was abolished in 1641 by an act 
of Parliament.33 But contemporary complaints about the abuses of the 
Star Chamber do not include criticism of the closed nature of the court’s 
proceedings.34 While it is true that the procedures of the Star Chamber 
required a defendant to be “examined privately by the examiner, an offi-
cial of the court, neither his counsel nor any co-defendant being present 
                                                     
 28. SIR THOMAS SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM (L. Alston ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1906) (1584). 
 29. Id. at 100. 
 30. See Davis v. United States, 247 F. 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1917). “The provision is one of the 
important safeguards that were soon deemed necessary to round out the Constitution, and it was due 
to the historical warnings of the evil practice of the Star Chamber in England.” Id. 
 31. Marvin M. Lomax, The Court of Star Chamber – A Tudor Creation?, 45 PROC. OKLA. 
ACAD. SCI., 167, 169 (1965). 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Edward P. Cheyney, The Court of Star Chamber, 18 AM. HIST. REV. 727, 749 (1913). 
 34. Max Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 TEMP. L.Q. 381, 387 (1932).  
The speech of Lord Andover against the Star Chamber is almost exclusively 
concerned with the vexation of the nobility by this court, but not one word about 
its secrecy or its denial of the safeguards of liberty. Again, the long preamble of 
the Act which abolished the Star Chamber, although it cites all the statutes from 
Magna Charta down, which have anything to do with liberty of the subject and 
denounces the Star Chamber for its arbitrary character and its excessive and unu-
sual punishments, has not a word about the secrecy of its procedure. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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to advise him as to his answer[,]”35 the sessions of the court itself were 
open to the public. It was the perceived arbitrariness and severity of the 
court’s rulings, rather than the secrecy of its proceedings, that led to the 
court’s demise.36 
This analysis is bolstered by the fact that neither of the two most 
significant documents articulating the rights of English citizens, which 
were both drafted in the same century as the demise of the Star Chamber, 
speak to a right to publicly held legal proceedings. The Petition of Rights 
of 1628 was adopted by Parliament approximately thirteen years before 
the Star Chamber was abolished, and the Bill of Rights of 1689 was 
passed by Parliament forty-eight years after the Star Chamber was abol-
ished.37 It seems logical to assume that if the secret nature of judicial 
proceedings was truly a concern of the time, these documents would 
have articulated a right to publicly conducted legal proceedings, but nei-
ther document includes such a right. 
Some judges and scholars have pointed to the trial of Lieutenant-
Colonel John Lilburne in 1649 as evidence that English common law 
included a right to be tried in public.38 Howell’s State Trials reports that 
Lilburne stated: 
I was sometimes summoned before a committee of parliament, 
where Mr. Corbet, and several others have had the chair; and there I 
stood upon my right by the laws of England, and refused to proceed 
with the said committee, till by special order they caused their doors 
to be wide thrown open, that the people might have free and unin-
terrupted access to hear, see and consider of what they said to 
me . . . and I did refuse (as of right) to proceed with them, till by 
special order they did open their doors.39 
The problem with relying on this passage for the proposition that English 
common law guaranteed criminal defendants a right to have their trials 
occur in public is that the passage comes from a speech by the defendant 
himself, not a ruling of the court. The defendant relates a situation in 
which he refused to testify before a committee of the parliament as to the 
allegations against him until the hearing was made public. 
                                                     
 35. Cheyney, supra note 33, at 738. 
 36. Id. at 749. 
 37. Petition of Right, 1628, 3 Car 1, c.1; The Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. & M. sess. 2, c. 2. 
 38. See, e.g., Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 387 n.18 (1979); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 
257, 266 n.14 (1948); RICHARD GOLDFARB, TV OR NOT TV: TELEVISION, JUSTICE, AND THE 
COURTS 44 (1998); SUSAN HERMAN, THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY AND PUBLIC TRIAL 13–14 (2006).  
 39. The Trial of Lieutenant-Colonel John Lilburne, at the Guildhall of London for High Trea-
son, [1649] 4 Ho. St. Tr. 1274 (Eng.), available at http://www.constitution.org/trials/howell/ 
04_howells_state_trials.pdf. 
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In the same passage, the defendant complains that “as I came in, I 
found the gates shut and guarded, which is contrary both to law and jus-
tice.”40 Judge Keble responds by saying, “Mr. Lilburne, look behind you, 
and see whether the door stands open or no.”41 At this point, the defend-
ant seems satisfied that his trial is being conducted in public and he re-
sumes his complaints as to other injustices he is suffering. This exchange 
bolsters the evidence that English common law included a tradition in 
which trials were held in public, but Mr. Lilburne was unable to cite to 
any authority for the proposition that he had a right to be tried in public, 
and there is no evidence that the court ever made an explicit ruling as 
such. 
By the late 1600s, legal scholars were finally articulating arguments 
about the importance of publicly held legal proceedings with particulari-
ty. Sir Matthew Hale in 1670 and Sir William Blackstone, who cited to 
Hale during the same period, write about the importance that witnesses 
be examined in public.42 It is possible that these scholars were con-
trasting the English common law system with the Roman system of civil 
law or with the private examination of witnesses that was permitted in 
the Star Chamber proceedings. However, neither scholar claimed that 
defendants had a right to publicly held trials nor that the public had an 
independent right to be present during legal proceedings. 
B. Public Trial Rights in Colonial America 
Early colonial charters had many divergent things to say on the use 
of juries,43 but rarely mentioned that criminal trials should be public. 
West New Jersey, however, in its Charter, did explicitly mention that 
trials, both civil and criminal, were to be public. It stated: 
That in all publick courts of justice for tryals of causes, civil or 
criminal, any person or persons, inhabitants of the said Province 
may freely come into, and attend the said courts, and hear and be 
present, at all or any such tryals as shall be there had or passed, that 
justice may not be done in a corner nor in any covert manner, being 
intended and resolved, by the help of the Lord, and by these our 
                                                     
 40. Id. at 1273. 
 41. Id. at 1274. 
 42. SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND ch.12 (Charles M. 
Gray, ed., Univ. Chicago Press 1971) (1670) (noting examination was undertaken “in the open court, 
and in the presence of the parties, their attorneys, counsel and all bystanders”); 3 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *396 (“[The] open examination of witnesses viva voce, in the pres-
ence of all mankind, is much more conducive to the clearing up of the truth.”). 
 43. See, e.g., The Massachusetts Body of Liberties §§ 30–31 (1641); The Charter of Funda-
mental Laws of West New Jersey ch. XXII (1676). For the text of these colonial charters, see 1 
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 49–179 (1971). 
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Concessions and Fundamentals, that all and every person and per-
sons inhabiting the said Province, shall, as far as in us lies, be free 
from oppression and slavery.44 
Similar decrees for public trials exist in the Fundamental Constitutions 
for the Province of East Jersey and in the early colonial codes in Penn-
sylvania.45 
However, the provision regarding criminal procedure adopted by 
the Constitutional Congress in 1787 makes no reference to the public 
nature of trials. Many states adopted language in their own constitutions 
protecting what they considered inviolable procedural safeguards for the 
accused, including the right to be tried by a jury of twelve men of the 
vicinage,46 public trials,47 as well as to the right to witnesses48 and to the 
assistance of counsel.49 The language and substance of these protections 
varied so widely that the delegates at the Constitutional Convention 
made little to no effort to come to consensus.50 Many delegations were 
upset by the proposal’s failure to protect more of the accused’s rights in 
the Constitution, adding more fuel to the discussion for an enumerated 
Bill of Rights. After much debate, more to do with the extent and geo-
graphical purview of the trial-by-jury protection, the Sixth Amendment, 
which protects, among other things, “the right to a speedy and public 
trial,” was adopted in 1789.51 
For most of our country’s history, courts and legal scholars have 
paid far more attention to the right of defendants to a speedy trial than to 
the right to a public trial. There have only been two direct interpretations 
by the Supreme Court with regard to a criminal defendant’s right to a 
public trial. In both cases, the defendants requested their trials be made 
open, and their requests were granted.52 The majority of other Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence involves a defendant seeking to avoid publici-
ty in order to ensure a fair trial (i.e., a nonbiased jury) or the government 
                                                     
 44. Charter Fundamental Laws of West New Jersey, supra note 43, at ch. XXIII (emphasis 
added). 
 45. FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 17–18 (1st ed. 1969). 
 46. VA. BILL OF RIGHTS art. VII (1776). 
 47. N.C. CONST. art. IX (1776) (stating that proceedings shall be held “in open court”). 
 48. N.J. CONST. art. XVI (1776). 
 49. MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. XIX (1776); N.J. CONST. art. XVII (1776). 
 50. See HELLER, supra note 45, at 24 (“The original Virginia plan contained no references 
whatsoever to the procedure [for] criminal cases . . . .”). New Jersey, Hamilton, and Pinckney all 
proposed language preserving the right to a trial by jury and Pinckney’s preserving open and public 
trials. Id. 
 51. The limited information shows that the Amendment is essentially language from the ratify-
ing convention in Virginia, which was itself based on a proposal of the Bill of Rights written by 
George Mason. Id. at 34. 
 52. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984). 
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seeking to protect a witness or to protect confidential information. The 
Court has explicitly recognized that the right of an accused to a public 
trial is to ensure that their trial is conducted fairly53 and is thus, not in-
tended to eliminate the chance of an unbiased jury, but rather to avoid 
governmental abuse of the system. 
C. The History of Article I, Section 10 of the Washington 
Constitution 
The record surrounding the framing and adoption of the Washing-
ton constitution is unfortunately sparse. What the historical record does 
show is that Article I, Section 10 of the Washington constitution exists in 
its current form as it was initially proposed: “Justice in all cases shall be 
administered openly, and without unnecessary delay.”54 We know that 
there was an amendment proposed to this section on July 11, 1889, 
(which was ultimately rejected) that would have changed the wording to: 
“No court shall be secret but justice shall be administered openly and 
without prejudice, completely and without delay and every person shall 
have remedy by due course of law for injury done him in his person, 
property or reputation.”55 We can speculate that the framers of the 1889 
constitution likely had access to the state constitution proposed and rati-
fied eleven years earlier, which never went into effect as the earlier ef-
forts for Washington’s statehood were unsuccessful. The open courts 
provision of the 1878 constitution, Article V, Section 9, read as follows: 
Every person in the State shall be entitled to a certain remedy in the 
law, for all wrongs and injuries which he may receive in his person, 
character or property; justice shall be administered to all, freely and 
without purchase; completely and without denial; promptly and 
without delay; and all Courts shall be open to the public.56 
Interestingly, this prior version of the provision more closely resembles 
clause 40 of Magna Carta than the open courts provision of the constitu-
tion that was adopted in 1889. Furthermore, the earlier open courts pro-
vision specifically articulates the need for courts to be open to the public, 
as compared to the vague language of the 1889 constitution requiring 
                                                     
 53. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270 (“Whatever other benefits the guarantee to an accused that his 
trial be conducted in public may confer upon our society, the guarantee has always been recognized 
as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution. The 
knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public 
opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power.”) (footnote omitted). 
 54. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 55. THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION WITH 
ANALYTICAL INDEX BY QUENTIN SHIPLEY SMITH 499 (Beverly P. Rosenow ed., 1962). 
 56. WASH. CONST. art. V, § 9 (1878), available at https://www.sos.wa.gov/_assets/legacy/1878 
Constitution.pdf. 
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only that “justice . . . be administered openly.”57 There is no evidence 
that the framers intended Article I, Section 10 of the Washington consti-
tution to guarantee a right to members of the public to access legal pro-
ceedings that is separate from the rights of litigants in the court system. 
Neither historical documents at the time this provision was adopted, nor 
contemporary court opinions support such a reading. 
D. Recent Interpretations of Article I, Section 10 
Between the adoption of the Washington constitution in 1889 and 
1974, there were eighteen cases heard by the Washington State Supreme 
Court in which Article I, Section 10 of the state constitution was refer-
enced.58 Most of these cases made only a passing reference to Article 1, 
Section 10,59 and referred only to the speedy trial provision of Article 1, 
Section 10, or the ruling of the court is premised on the criminal defend-
ant’s right to a public trail as articulated in Article 1, Section 22.60 Only 
one of the cases, In re Lewis in 1957, included an analysis and interpreta-
tion of the public trial provision of Article I, Section 10. 
In 1957, the In re Lewis court upheld a statute closing juvenile 
court hearings, recognizing that such hearings are closed for the benefit 
of the child that is the subject of the hearing.61 The court explained that 
“[t]he purpose of excluding the public from proceedings such as these is, 
of course, to protect the child from notoriety and its ill effects.”62 The 
court went on to note that similar statutes in other states had been up-
held.63 
Therefore, prior to 1975, the Washington State Supreme Court had 
not interpreted Article I, Section 10 to grant the public an independent 
right of access to legal proceedings. The Cohen court was the first to do 
so, claiming that the right of the public was generally recognized64 and 
that Article I, Section 10 “entitle[d] the public . . . to openly administered 
                                                     
 57. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 58. This search was conducted multiple times and occurred most recently on March 2, 2016. 
 59. See, e.g., N. Springs Water Co. v. City of Tacoma, 58 P. 773, 776 (1899) (company suing 
for contract breach invokes Article I, Section 10 to secure equal “protection”); Rauch v. Chapman, 
48 P. 253, 255 (1897) (listing open courts provision as part of larger discussion of the rights enumer-
ated in the state constitution). 
 60. See, e.g., State v. Colson, 115 P.2d 677, 678 (1941); State v. Gaines, 258 P. 508, 514 
(1923) (guaranteeing “to everyone accused of crime the right to a public trial”); see also State v. 
Marsh, 217 P. 705, 705–06 (1923) (finding that an adult tried in juvenile court had not been granted 
his constitutional right to a public trial). 
 61. In re Lewis, 316 P.2d 907, 910 (Wash. 1957). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Cohen v. Everett City Council, 535 P.2d 801, 802 (Wash 1975). For this proposition, the 
court cited a Third Circuit case from 1958 and extrapolated the right of the media from the right of 
the public. See Tribune Review Publ’g v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883, 884 (3d Cir. 1958). 
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justice.”65 This was a dramatic leap in the court’s jurisprudence, yet the 
court failed to acknowledge it at the time. 
The Cohen case stemmed from the revocation of a city license for a 
sauna parlor in Everett.66 The Everett City Council had considered the 
matter in closed session pursuant to a statute that permitted the city 
council to hold a closed session for such matters.67 The licensee moved 
for an order sealing the transcript of the revocation hearing when appeal-
ing the revocation to the superior court.68 The licensee’s sealing motion 
was granted, and a subsequent continuing order of confidentiality was 
granted after the superior court upheld the city council’s decision to re-
voke the license.69 The Everett Herald, a daily newspaper, moved to have 
the continuing order set aside so that the newspaper could have access to 
the transcript.70 The issue before the Washington State Supreme Court 
was limited to the validity of the continuing order of confidentiality. 
Apart from articulating a new public right, the remainder of the 
court’s decision was relatively modest. The court did not rule a statute 
unconstitutional; rather, it found that there was a presumption of open-
ness of court proceedings and that there were no grounds in the instant 
case, statutorily or otherwise, for the transcript to remain confidential.71 
The court explicitly recognized the validity of closed adoption hearings, 
closed juvenile court proceedings, and other circumstances that justify a 
court closure.72 
Following Cohen, the courts in Washington have greatly expanded 
public access to legal proceedings. In 1980, in Federated Publications, 
Inc. v. Kurtz, a Washington appellate court held that the public had a 
right to attend not only trials but also pretrial hearings.73 Concurrently, a 
similar line of reasoning appeared at the federal level. The same year as 
Kurtz, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the First Amendment 
                                                     
 65. Cohen, 535 P.2d at 803. 
 66. Id. at 802. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 803–04. 
 72. Id. at 803. 
 73. Federated Publ’ns, Inc. v. Kurtz, 615 P.2d 440 (Wash. 1980). The court barred the press 
and public from a pretrial suppression hearing in order to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial 
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In addition, the court noted the “significant textual difference” between the federal and state consti-
tution on the matter of open court proceedings. Id. at 443. Because the public could observe the court 
deciding whether or not to admit evidence and whether its decision was fair, the court extended the 
independent right of public access to this type of “judicial proceeding” as well. 
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to include a public right to attend legal proceedings.74 On one hand, there 
is no textual equivalent to Article I, Section 10 in the federal Constitu-
tion. For this reason, the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the First Amendment is even more reliant on an inaccurate interpretation 
of English common law. On the other hand, the jurisprudence of the 
United States Supreme Court has not been as extreme as the Washington 
State Supreme Court when it comes to the public’s right to access legal 
proceedings and court documents.75 
While Cohen was the first case to articulate an independent right of 
the public to access legal proceedings, Seattle Times v. Ishikawa, heard 
seven years later, became the seminal case defining the balance between 
the public’s right to access legal proceedings and a party’s motion to 
close a proceeding or seal a record.76 The Ishikawa case arose from State 
v. Marler, in which defendant Cynthia Marler filed a motion to dismiss 
the case and a motion to close the courtroom on her motion to dismiss.77 
The prosecutor in the case concurred in Marler’s motion to close the 
courtroom.78 The trial judge, Judge Richard Ishikawa, granted the motion 
to close, denied the motion to dismiss, and sealed the records relating to 
the motion to dismiss.79 Marler was subsequently convicted of murder. 
The Seattle Times and The Seattle Post–Intelligencer challenged the clo-
sure and the sealing, a challenge that was eventually heard by the Wash-
ington State Supreme Court. Instead of making a final decision, the court 
remanded the case and directed the trial court to consider a newly created 
balancing test. According to the court, the proponent of the closure must 
first demonstrate the need for closure. Second, anyone present must have 
the opportunity to object to the closure. Third, the requested closure 
should be the least restrictive means of closure. Fourth, the court must 
weigh the competing interests of the public and of the proponent of clo-
sure.80 The test is sometimes interpreted as having a fifth factor, which is 
that the closure order should be no broader in its application than is nec-
essary to serve its purpose. Although, for practical purposes, the fifth 
factor of the analysis is generally the same as the third factor. Subsequent 
case law cites to these factors as the “Ishikawa factors.”81 
                                                     
 74. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980). 
 75. This right has not been extended to civil proceedings, a distinction that some jurists in 
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 76. See generally Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 640 P.2d 716 (Wash. 1982). 
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 80. Id. at 720–21. 
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The newly created balancing test—the “Ishikawa factors”—is com-
plicated in a number of ways. First, it may be difficult to articulate a rea-
son for requesting closure without divulging the information that the 
proponent of the closure is seeking to protect. Second, if there is no party 
objecting to the closure, the court must weigh the interest of the public in 
the absence of an advocate seeking to protect the public’s interest. 
Following the Ishikawa ruling, one of the most shocking open 
courts rulings came in 1993 in Allied Daily Newspapers v. Eikenberry.82 
The court in Eikenberry ruled a statute protecting juvenile victims of 
sexual assault unconstitutional because the statute prohibited the disclo-
sure of identifying information for all minor victims of sexual assault, 
rather than permitting a case-by-case assessment of the need for clo-
sure.83 In Eikenberry, the court repeatedly referred to the Ishikawa fac-
tors as defining when and how court proceedings and court documents 
could be closed.84 The court concluded by saying “any closure of tradi-
tionally open judicial proceedings is permissible under Const. art. 1, § 10 
only if closure is necessary according to the guidelines this court previ-
ously defined in Kurtz and Ishikawa.”85 
The message after Eikenberry was that the legislature cannot pass 
laws protecting the privacy rights of Washington citizens if those laws 
permit a court to seal a record. The exceptions are cases that were not 
“traditionally open” and cases in which the legislature permitted an indi-
vidualized assessment using the Ishikawa factors. Of course, a litigant 
can always seek to close a hearing or seal a record using the Ishikawa 
factors; thus, in practice, there is no way for the legislature to weigh in 
on such issues. 
As the state courts’ jurisprudence became more and more extreme, 
litigants tested the boundaries of openness. Because Ishikawa and its 
progeny require an individualized assessment, virtually any closure, no 
matter how minor or incidental, could constitute grounds to overturn a 
criminal conviction on appeal. Appeals were brought challenging convic-
tions in which a sidebar was conducted outside the courtroom;86 jury 
questionnaires in which jurors were asked about their personal experi-
ence with sexual assault were sealed;87 where a judge answered a ques-
                                                     
 82. Allied Daily Newspapers v. Eikenberry, 848 P.2d 1258 (Wash. 1993). 
 83. Id. at 1259, 1261. 
 84. Id. at 1261. 
 85. Id. at 1262. 
 86. See State v. Smith, 334 P.3d 1049 (Wash. 2014). 
 87. See In re Stockwell, 248 P.3d 576 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). 
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tion from the jury in chambers;88 and where a defendant sought to seal 
their competency evaluation in order to protect their privacy.89 
In 2011, in In re Detention of D.F.F., the Washington State Su-
preme Court struck down Superior Court Mental Proceeding Rule 1.3, 
which protected the privacy of individuals subject to involuntary com-
mitment proceedings.90 The rule provided that involuntary commitment 
proceedings “shall not be open to the public, unless the person who is the 
subject of the proceedings or his attorney files with the court a written 
request that the proceedings be public.”91 The rule was designed to pro-
tect the privacy interests of people who may not have the capacity or 
wherewithal to protect their own privacy interests. The rule also permit-
ted open proceedings if the subject or the subject’s attorney believed 
public access was in the subject’s interest.92 However, once again, the 
court gave greater weight to the abstract right to public legal proceedings 
than to the concrete harms that may befall an individual who is subjected 
to a public involuntary commitment hearing.93 
Since 2009, the court has heard more than thirty cases involving in-
terpretations of Article I, Section 10, making it one of the most litigated 
issues before the court in recent years.94 
E. Narrowing the Scope of the Public Right 
Over the past several years, the Washington State Supreme Court 
has recognized that requiring an in-depth individualized analysis when-
ever any aspect of a case is closed or sealed is unworkable. Rather, there 
are only some aspects of a case and a case record that are presumptively 
open and require an in-depth individualized assessment; other aspects of 
a case, on the other hand, are not presumptively open. However, the 
court has struggled to define what aspects of a case are presumptively 
open. 
In 2008, in State v. Sadler, a Washington appellate court distin-
guished between hearings on “purely ministerial or legal issues” and res-
olution of disputed issues of fact.95 The court reasoned that the presump-
tion of openness applied only to resolution of disputed issues of fact.96 
                                                     
 88. See State v. Sublett, 292 P.3d 715 (Wash. 2012). 
 89. See State v. Chao Chen, 309 P.3d 410 (Wash. 2013). 
 90. In re Det. of D.F.F., 256 P.3d 357 (Wash. 2011). 
 91. Wash. Sup. Ct. MPR 1.3 (rescinded effective Apr. 30, 2013). 
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 93. In re D.F.F., 256 P.3d at 363. 
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The court had similarly reasoned in State v. Rivera that “[t]he public trial 
right applies to the evidentiary phases of the trial[] and to other ‘adver-
sary proceedings.’”97 However, in 2012, the Washington State Supreme 
Court rejected this analysis in State v. Sublett, relying instead on the 
“Experience and Logic Test,” a test developed by the United States Su-
preme Court to interpret when the First Amendment required public ac-
cess to criminal proceedings.98 
The Experience and Logic Test, as adopted in Washington State, al-
lows a court to make an initial determination about whether the court 
proceeding or record that the litigant is seeking to close or seal is pre-
sumptively open. If the court determines that the proceeding or record is 
presumptively open, then it must evaluate the requested closure using the 
Ishikawa factors.99 However, evaluating whether the proceeding or doc-
ument is presumptively open requires a two-part analysis. First, the court 
asks “whether the place and process have historically been open to the 
press and general public”100—the Experience Prong. Second, the court 
must consider “whether public access plays a significant positive role in 
the functioning of the particular process in question”101—the Logic 
Prong. While neither prong is dispositive, the test provides a mechanism 
for the court to weigh the historical and logical underpinnings of the need 
for public access to a proceeding or a record. 
Both the Experience and Logic Test and the Ministerial/Factual dis-
tinction have been roundly criticized by justices and by academics.102 
Critics of the Experience and Logic Test argue that the test is so flexible 
that it provides very little guidance for lower courts.103 Moreover, due to 
its malleability, a court could reason its way to a conclusion of openness 
or closure in any given case. Similar criticisms have been leveled at the 
Ministerial/Factual distinction.104 It may be difficult for a court to draw 
the line between the ministerial aspects of a proceeding and the factual 
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 98. Sublett, 292 P.3d at 722–23. 
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determinations. Also, there may be significant decisions that should be 
presumptively open, which could be categorized as ministerial. 
And yet, critics of both tests have concluded that some threshold 
test was necessary. Prior to the court’s adoption of the Experience and 
Logic Test, there seemed to be no way for the legislature to offer input 
into what proceedings could be closed, and the lower courts were forced 
to consider the Ishikawa factors every time a sidebar occurred or a juror 
needed to answer an uncomfortable question in voir dire. 
Despite the repeated criticisms of the Experience and Logic Test, 
even the justices who initially opposed it in Sublett in 2012 now 
acknowledge that the test constitutes stare decises. Accordingly, they 
have subsequently signed onto opinions that use the test.105 Since the 
adoption of this test, the court has begun to narrow its open courts juris-
prudence. In State v. Sykes, the court ruled that because drug court staff-
ings have not been traditionally open, there is no need for an individual-
ized Ishikawa assessment.106 In State v. S.J.C., the court upheld a statute 
that allows a juvenile offender to seal his record if the offender meets 
certain requirements, again supporting limited access to the records of 
juveniles.107 
II. REBALANCING PRIVACY RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO OPEN COURTS 
The Washington Supreme Court’s recent decisions reigning in its 
previous jurisprudence acknowledge the importance of privacy in rela-
tion to the openness of legal proceedings and court records. As Washing-
ton courts and litigants continue to develop the parameters of the Experi-
ence and Logic Test, we hope to add to this discussion. 
A. Acknowledging the Truth of Our Historical Experience 
Washington courts and the United States Supreme Court have al-
luded to centuries-old traditions and English common law.108 When con-
sidering the Experience Prong of the Experience and Logic Test, courts 
should acknowledge that English common law provided no explicit right 
to publicly held legal proceedings. While there was a tradition in which 
legal proceedings were scheduled at predetermined times and locations 
such that the public could attend, there is no documented right of an ac-
                                                     
 105. In 2015, Justice Charles Wiggins, formerly one of the most outspoken critics of the test, 
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cused or a litigant to have their case heard in public.109 It was not until 
colonial times, most notably in the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, that such a right was articulated.110 
Second, prior to 1975, neither the United States Constitution nor the 
Washington constitution were interpreted as granting a right to the pub-
lic, separate and apart from the right of a litigant, to access legal proceed-
ings and court documents.111 To the extent that such a right exists, it is 
based on a relatively recent interpretation of Article I, Section 10 of the 
Washington State constitution, or an even more recent interpretation of 
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
Third, we have a relatively limited experience of having documents 
available online and searchable as it relates to the entire history of our 
state. In the digital age, the risk of identity theft, stalking, or other misuse 
of information made public because of a court proceeding is far greater 
than it was when Article I, Section 10 was crafted. Therefore, the court 
might articulate a lower bar for statutes or procedures that seek to pre-
vent the misuse of information available online as compared to infor-
mation available at the courthouse. 
B. The Logic of Article I, Section 10 
The Logic Prong of the Experience and Logic Test, as articulated 
by the United States Supreme Court and adopted by the Washington Su-
preme Court, asks “whether public access plays a significant positive 
role in the functioning of the particular process in question.”112 However, 
when interpreting Article I, Section 10 of the Washington constitution, 
the court should ask a related but slightly different question: Would the 
closure or sealing prevent the public from evaluating the court’s admin-
istration of justice? All that the Washington constitution guarantees is the 
open administration of justice. Ultimately, the purpose of public legal 
proceedings is to ensure that the public can understand why and how the 
court reached a particular decision.113 Unfortunately, the court has denied 
sealing and redaction requests even when such requests would not inter-
fere with the public’s ability to evaluate the court’s administration of jus-
tice.114 
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Second, the right to privacy and the right to a fair trial, which are 
the rights litigants most commonly seek to protect when requesting a 
court closure or the sealing of a record, are also constitutionally protected 
rights.115 The harms that befall litigants through denial of these privacy 
rights are real and concrete, and such harms are exacerbated by the readi-
ly available nature of information in the digital age. 
Third, a dangerous attribute of the digital age is the pervasive na-
ture of online records. Once a document, photograph, or transcript is 
available to the public in electronic format, it can be impossible to erase. 
There is no way to put the genie back into the bottle. Therefore, when an 
individual’s privacy rights are at issue, the court should ensure that the 
public’s right to access the information truly outweighs the privacy rights 
of the litigant, as the litigant may never be able to recover from the pub-
lic exposure of the information, particularly if the information turns out 
to be false. 
Taken as a whole, these concepts and historical perspectives should 
help Washington courts and litigants to rebalance the privacy rights of 
Washingtonians with respect to the right of the public to access legal 
proceedings and documents. 
III. REEVALUATING PREVIOUS DECISIONS 
The authors respectfully suggest that the Washington State Su-
preme Court should reconsider some of its decisions by taking into con-
sideration the above-described history and analysis. Three particularly 
troubling decisions are Allied Daily Newspapers of Washington v. Eik-
enberry, In re Detention of D.F.F., and Hundtofte v. Encarnación. 
While the statute protecting juvenile victims of sexual assault at is-
sue in Eikenberry was broad, the court’s decision finding it unconstitu-
tional was an overly broad reaction.116 Since Eikenberry, the legislature 
has been reticent to make any effort to protect the privacy rights of 
Washingtonians as they relate to court records because the Eikenberry 
case appears to prohibit the legislature from allowing virtually any rec-
ords to be sealed without an individualized analysis. Therefore, despite 
living in a society where it has become easier for bad actors—
specifically, perpetrators of sexual assault—to misuse information avail-
able in court documents, very few limitations have been put in place to 
protect the misuse of such information. 
Using the framework of the Experience and Logic Test, if a court 
were to reexamine the issue in Eikenberry, the court might note that there 
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is a long history of statutes that protect the privacy rights of juveniles.117 
Additionally, there has been a history of judges limiting access to pro-
ceedings that include “salacious” testimony.118 When considering the 
recently articulated right of the public to access legal proceedings, the 
Experience Prong would seem to weigh in favor of permitting closure for 
such proceedings. While the closure of such proceedings would undoubt-
edly inhibit the public’s ability to evaluate the court’s administration of 
justice, the logic of closing proceedings in order to protect the privacy 
rights of juveniles should weigh in favor of closure. 
The most concerning aspect of In re Detention of D.F.F. is the fact 
that subjects of involuntary commitment are no longer presumed to bene-
fit from the protections of privacy offered by the prior version of the Su-
perior Court Mental Health Proceedings Rule. The rule the court struck 
down was put into effect in 1973, two years before the court recognized 
an independent right of the public to attend legal proceedings.119 There-
fore, there is a strong argument that the Experience Prong of the Experi-
ence and Logic Test would support the reinstatement of this rule. While 
closure of the proceedings would inhibit the public’s ability to evaluate 
the court’s administration of justice, we argue that the individuals’ priva-
cy rights in these circumstances should trump the public’s right to access 
such proceedings, particularly given the risk of misuse of such online 
records. 
Finally, despite the court’s adoption of the Experience and Logic 
Test in 2012, the court failed to apply this test in the 2014 case 
Hundtofte v. Encarnación.120 However, both the Experience Prong and 
the Logic Prong weighed against the conclusion of the court’s leading 
opinion. The tenants seeking redaction in Encarnación requested that the 
court’s online index be redacted.121 It is important to note that the ability 
of the public to access cases by searching for a defendant’s name in an 
online database was a very recent development. It was not until 1993 that 
all counties in Washington State started using the Superior Court Man-
agement Information System (SCOMIS), the index that the defendant in 
Encarnación sought to redact.122 For the first one hundred years of 
Washington’s history, the superior courts operated without the benefit of 
an online information system. It was within the past thirty years that 
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online access to information has been developing and changing, although 
the level of available information continues to differ in each county. 
The Logic Prong of the Experience and Logic Test also weighs 
against a finding that redacting the case name in SCOMIS constitutes a 
court closure. The requested redaction would not limit the public’s abil-
ity to continue evaluating the court’s fairness. Even if Encarnación’s re-
quested redaction had been granted, the public would still have been able 
to locate the case in SCOMIS by the case number or the name of Encar-
nación’s landlord. Alternatively, a member of the public could request 
bulk distributions of cases in order to evaluate unlawful detainer cases 
generally, or proceedings heard by a particular judge.123 The public’s 
lack of access to a defendant’s name in SCOMIS does not impair the 
public’s ability to evaluate the court’s administration of justice. 
We do not argue that the court should grant redaction requests 
lightly. Washington Court Rule GR 15 provides a robust framework for 
evaluating when a litigant has met the requirements necessary to redact 
information.124 We simply argue that such a redaction request should not 
require the constitutional analysis articulated in Ishikawa. 
CONCLUSION 
Moving forward, we hope Washington courts will use the Experi-
ence and Logic Test to continue to narrow the scope of cases that require 
an individualized Ishikawa assessment. Other states have begun to take 
measures to protect their citizens’ privacy rights in ways that the Wash-
ington Supreme Court’s jurisprudence now prevents the legislature from 
doing. As an example, California law now prevents the dissemination of 
erroneous eviction records by requiring that such cases be filed under 
seal. The cases are unsealed only if the landlord prevails.125 This type of 
measure will only be possible in Washington state if the Washington Su-
preme Court reexamines the historical basis for its broad interpretation of 
Article I, Section 10 and rebalances the right of the public to access legal 
proceedings and documents in relation to the privacy rights of the liti-
gants themselves. 
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